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Inequality exists so widely and has for so long it’s easy to assume
it’s natural. Yet, for most of the time we, homo sapiens sapiens
with language and abstract thought, have existed, equality has
prevailed in the sense that, prior to agriculture c 12,000 years
ago, there was no economic surplus. Hunter gatherers were
essentially egalitarians, though there is some evidence of slavery,
but that didn’t make them incapable of cruelty as Tobias
Schneebaum’s Keep The River on Your Right makes clear.
Capable of slaughtering neighbouring tribes and engaging in
cannibalism, they weren’t egalitarians by moral choice. However,
it’s reasonable to suggest we evolved to live co-operatively in
small groups. Leaving aside the dreadful violence Schneebaum writes
about, within their groups they tended towards
peaceableness. If we have an inherited nature, it developed
to match these conditions. On the one hand, co-operative and
egalitarian, on the other capable of astonishing brutality and
inhumanity; but predominantly the former.
The important point is universality: we share our nature. The
inequality we’re used to rests on assumed intrinsic distinctions.
Slavery existed widely and for a long period because slaves were
deemed to be lesser creatures than their owners. The highly
civilised Greeks could philosophise about freedom and democracy
while simultaneously treating their slaves like beasts. Monarchy and
aristocracy assume the given superiority of the rulers, feudalism
took for granted the diminished nature of vassals and capitalism
would have been impossible without the axiom that people of property
(men in particular) are different in kind from people who sell their
work to live. There is much rhetoric of equality and human rights in
the advanced democracies, but beneath the bluster, the premise
remains: social distinctions correspond to natural differences.
“Entrepreneurs” have a different nature from the rest of us.
“Workers” are workers by definition. Of course, false notions like
“meritocracy” or “social mobility” keep alive the illusion the
system is fair: anyone can “make it”, as the failed “American Dream”
proposed; yet the evidence tells a different story. What proportion
of people born into the top ten percent in the UK over the past
fifty years has slipped into the bottom ten percent? Likewise, what
percentage has moved in the other direction? The data are stubborn:
if you’re born into wealth you stay there. If you’re born into
poverty, your chances of rising much above it aren’t high.
This might provide an argument for the Right: it’s the natural
order: some are born to be wealthy, others to be poor. The problem
is, in order to avoid uprising, capitalist societies have had to
embrace universal suffrage (to call it democracy would be
inaccurate). When people can vote, telling them they are inferior by
nature is slightly risky; hence the sentimentality of
the concepts just mentioned. On the one hand, people are told
they live in a society of opportunity if they are willing to make
the effort, on the other, policy works decisively to ensure wealth
and power stay in few hands.
At the same time, the doctrine of the market sets up a smokescreen
for injustice: no one chooses this, it’s simply what the market, an
abstract force beyond human control, delivers. Thus, the market
pushes the banking and financial system to the edge of collapse and
the free-marketeers are transmogrified into Statists, some of them
calling for the temporary wholesale nationalisation of the banks.
The market is wise when it makes them rich and to be halted when it
risks the destruction of their system. The market is nothing more
than the aggregate effect of many human decisions, but the decisions
of the rich have far more influence than those of the rest. Tens of
millions vote, but the corporates decide. That’s how democracy and
the market function.
On the extreme Right in contemporary capitalist societies, faith in
the market collapses into a belief in the authoritarian State whose
doctrine is nationalism, supremacism and militarism. This is ever at
hand, as the self-declared believers in the market always rely on
the State to keep the meddlesome masses in order. Even in its
mildest form, right-wing ideology denies a shared human nature. The
justification for inequality is always a recourse to nature: this is
how things are meant to be. Natural distinctions create their social
counterparts; but as Richard Lewontin has argued, differences are
biological, distinctions social. All kinds of variations in natural
endowment exist: some have better hand-eye co-ordination,
mathematical aptitude, musical ability and so on. None of which
implies any social distinction. There is no necessary connection
between being able to run faster than others or play the piano more
expertly, and wealth or power. Amongst our hunter-gatherer ancestors
there must have been potential Roger Federers or Bill Gatses, but
their talent implied no economic or social distinction because they
lacked a culture which could permit it. J.S. Bach made an
extraordinary contribution to music yet has anyone ever suggested
his talent ought to have made him a dictator? Hence, the exorbitant
rewards for talent in our culture can’t be natural.
At the most base level, there is the belief that a biological
difference like skin colour should be the cause of social
distinction. White supremacism has played an enormous role in modern
history, and still does. That the idea is thoroughly irrational
hasn’t lessened its virulence. Less respectable today, it still
exerts its malign influence. In the same way, it’s somewhat
unacceptable now to express directly the idea that the poor deserve
their poverty, yet the notion prevails. When George Osborne spoke of
hard-working people setting off in the morning while the curtains of
the benefits claimants next door were still closed, he was igniting
the nasty belief that the poor are feckless, lazy and therefore
responsible for their poverty and blameworthy. It’s a small step to
the conviction that they aren’t like us. They are different by
nature. Difference justifies inequality.
The notion of a universal human nature is problematic for the Right.
They seek a resolution in a distorted conception: by nature we are
competitive, self-interested, egocentric, inclined to ignore the
needs of others, Thus, the inequality of capitalism is the result of
the playing out of our nature. “Entrepreneurs”, by being
self-interested, provide us with our dinner. If we didn’t permit
them to seek enormous wealth, we would all be picking nuts and
berries. Greed is good. That’s the way the world works. Yet, if
workers strike, they are condemned as selfish, “holding the country
to ransom”, doing the wrong thing. The Right evokes a human nature
which it has to deny in order to keep the workers in their place.
It’s an odd human nature which doesn’t exist in most of the
population: the incoherence of right-wing ideology.
The idea of a shared human nature is of great benefit to the Left.
If our species capacities are inherited and pre-determined, it makes
sense to organize our culture around them. It ought to be a
fundamental precept of the Left that negative social distinctions
offend our nature. Obviously, the Left has won the argument over
white supremacism. Only the far-right which loathes democracy is
self-consciously supremacist. As mentioned, the old irrationality
bubbles away beneath the surface of apparent equal rights, but for a
large majority in the dominant capitalist societies, supremacism has
become disreputable. The Left has done the work. The same is true
about LGBTQ rights. In these important ways, the Left has asserted
our common humanity and the justice of equal rights.
Yet the Left is burdened by an inherited incoherence which is at the
heart of Marx’s sociology. Marx denies the existence of an inherited
human nature. Fundamental to his theory is the notion that what we
are is the product of particular economic relations:
“..the essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each
single individual. In its actuality it is reducible to the ensemble
of social or historically developing socio-economic relationships.”
(Theses on Feuerbach).
What he means by “inhering in each single individual” is
biologically determined, our given endowment. This is Marx’s simple
refutation of the notion of a given human nature. Yet it takes no
more than a few minutes reflection to see how misguided this is. It
looks as though Marx forced himself to accept it in order to keep
his theory consistent. He was committing the fundamental error of
refusing to change his theory in the light of the evidence. That we
have a biologically given nature is almost too obvious to need
stating. At the physiological level, if you breath in and out of a
paper bag for long enough, you will go faint. This applies to
everyone. The length of time varies from individual to individual,
but not greatly: no one can do it for a week. This is our human
nature at a very basic level. It isn’t reducible to socio-economic
relationships. It’s our biological inheritance.
There are any number of such examples, but language is particularly
potent. It inheres in each single individual and has since it
emerged some fifty thousand years ago, almost certainly by a random
mutation in a single individual. Across those fifty thousand years
there have been many differing socio-economic relationships, but the
language faculty has remained unchanged. It’s important to make a
distinction between language in use, the externalised form we use to
speak or write, and the internal faculty. The external form changes
all the time, but the internal faculty doesn’t.
Marx’s notion of “species-being” doesn’t amount to a recognition of
an inherited, fixed, universal nature. He wrote, “In the mode of
life activity lies the entire character of the species.” The
adjective is crucial: everything we are is determined by “life
activity”. Our nature is not permanent and universal but determined
by specific historical formations. He refers to “an internal, dumb
generality” to suggest that what is endowed by nature is uncreative.
“It is true,” he argues, “ that eating, drinking and procreating etc
are genuine human functions. However, when abstracted from other
aspects of human activity, and turned into final and exclusive ends,
they are animal.” Presumably he doesn’t intend “animal” as a
compliment. What does he mean by “other aspects of human activity”?
His assumption is that productive activity, work, completes our
nature. What is granted by biology is “dumb”, “animal”. Only when we
begin to transform it by the way we produce our means of life, do we
rise above this base level.
In Marx’s terms, therefore, language is “animal”. It is as natural
as eating, drinking and procreating. Yet it distinguishes us from
the other animals. Exclusively human, remarkably creative, Marx
would have been lost without it. It isn’t true that only when we
begin to produce our means of life do we become linguistic or
capable of abstract thought: these are pre-determined capacities. We
are creative by nature and this is true universally. Marx didn’t
take this for granted but expressed supremacist notions on several
occasions. He attributed negative characteristics to Jews, as if
they were products of biological inheritance, and was enthusiastic,
in a letter to Engels about Pierre Tremaux’s theory which claimed to
establish a link between the quality of the soil and human
capacities, commenting that Tremaux had “proved that the common
Negro type is the degenerate form of a much higher one..”. That Marx
could think in terms of a “common Negro type” suggests he believed
in given, significant given differences between human populations.
That he considered this proven indicates a somewhat cavalier
tendency to embrace conclusions matching pre-suppositions.
Crucially, it militates against recognition
of a permanent, universal nature.
Obviously, Marx had to accept the fact of our biology. Our
physiology, our arms and legs, lungs and hearts pre-exist particular
economic relations. Yet he needs to see this as low-level, as
“animal” and “dumb”. It’s our practical activity which raises us
above the level of the animal. This is simply wrong given that
language and abstract thought are as much a part of our given
capacities and breathing and walking. Marx needs to downgrade what
is provided by nature in order to elevate what is produced by our
effort to produce our means of life. His push for a coherent theory
makes him incoherent.
Darwin called language “An instinct to acquire an art”, which
succinctly elaborates the paradox that the language faculty is a
given fact of our nature, but in order to speak we need to be part
of a linguistic community. It is our nature to require the social
trigger which permits the language faculty to be externalised in
speech. Biology, that is, has made us social. This has been so since
language emerged and it hasn’t altered over fifty thousand years. If
Marx were right, this wouldn’t be possible. That our humanity
inheres in inherited, fixed capacities undermines the essence of his
theory. It has to be true, for his theory to stand, that mere
biological attributes are no match for the capacities we develop in
and through our productive activity. Marx may be able accept our
given physiological nature but he is impelled to deny endowed social
or moral capacities.
“In producing their means of life,” he writes, “men enter into
specific relations which are indispensable and independent of their
will.” As production proceeds, the “forces of production” come into
conflict with the “relations of production”, the latter burst
asunder and a new form of society arises. There is a clear sense in
this of a blind process. Certainly, it refuses any sense of moral
decision. Marx recognises a distinction between pre-history and
history but he has little to say about the fact that during the
former, humanity barely produced its means of life. Rather, we
relied on the bounty of nature. We were hunter-gatherers for almost
forty thousand years and during that period, the greater portion of
our species life, “relations of production” were effectively
non-existent. Nor was this a time marked by revolutions which
transformed one version of society into another. Social relations
among hunter-gatherers serve reproduction more than production. This
can be excused by accepting Marxism as a theory of history, ie the
past twelve thousand years, but a theory of human society which more
or less ignores forty thousand years is hardly comprehensive. The
important point is that those hunter-gatherers had the same
species-capacities as us. Of course, their cultural capacities were
very different: you can’t compose symphonies without equal
temperament and violins, but there were mute inglorious Beethovens
among pre-historic populations.
Our capacities are altered as we change our circumstances, but our
species-capacities aren’t transformed. We aren’t more linguistically
capable now than we were twenty thousand years ago. We have invented
alphabets and writing and filled libraries, but the fundamental
operation of the internal language faculty which makes that possible
hasn’t changed, any more than the circulation of the blood or the
functioning of the heart. Further, we have almost certainly been
moral creatures for the same length of time we’ve been linguistic.
Our moral conceptions change as we change our circumstances, but,
like language, moral discrimination depends on a given faculty. Marx
is pointing to the obvious: people think and behave very differently
in twenty-first century America than in twelfth-century France and
that is because social circumstances have been transformed; but what
those circumstances work upon hasn’t altered. A thousand years ago,
people used their lips, tongue and larynx to externalise language,
just as they do now, and children acquired language effortlessly and
unconsciously, as today. Marx exaggerates. He wants it to be true
that a new form of society will create a new human being and so
proposes an “empty organism” theory; but it isn’t necessary to
contend that we have no given, permanent nature in order to
recognise the possibility of social and moral progress. On the
contrary, it is only because we are moral creatures by nature that
such progress is possible.
If it were true that the “entire character of the species” is a
product of the activity of producing the means of life, what would
we be prior to that activity? How could we even engage in productive
activity without a given nature which made it possible? Without a
given nature, we would be some kind of amorphous blob. Marx falls
into this incoherence in his urgent need to persuade, his desire for
an all-embracing theory.
Human nature exists within very narrow limits which is evident in
physiology. No one is twenty feet tall nor weighs a tonne.
What strike us as great
differences are objectively superficial. Paradoxically, it is these
limits, in the mental sphere, which provide our creativity. Once
again, language provides the evidence: from a very small set of
simple operations (probably just one), by a generative process, we
are able to produce an infinite array of sentences. It’s the
restricted, optimal nature of the essential operation which provides
the extraordinary creativity. The social formations we elaborate
through our activity, work on what is given, but the creativity is
endowed. Marx has difficulty with this. For him, human nature isn’t
modified by changing social conditions, rather the economic
conditions bring our nature into being. A proposition which makes no
sense, for how could an amorphous blob be transformed into a
creative intelligence if it wasn’t endowed with the capacity?
Marx argues that it is in the act of producing our means of life
that we distinguish ourselves from the animals, which ignores how
our biological endowment distinguishes us. He recognises other
creatures transform nature to their ends to some extent (birds build
nests, bees make hives) but contends we are different in that we
envisage the transformation in our minds before we realise it.
However, the capacity to do so isn’t a product of our work on the
world, it's given. We differ from birds, bees and all other animals
in having the capacity for abstract thought as part of our nature.
The evidence suggests this capacity came into existence at the same
time as language. Neither is the outcome of our effort to transform
reality through labour.
It's often remarked that Marx turned Hegel on his head, in the sense
that the latter believed that Spirit was the motive force of
history, while Marx believes it is the work we perform in producing
our means of life. Yet the hangover from Hegel is the denial of
choice. Marx sees the replacement of capitalism by communism as
inevitable, whether we like it or not. It won’t come about because
we choose it, but because the principle of history, that the forces
of production become too powerful for the relations of production,
dictates it. The agent of change may be the proletariat, but not
because working people will choose. They will be forced to bring
about change, more or less blindly. Marx has difficulty in seeing
people as moral agents, for the obvious reason that if you’re
elaborating a theory of historical inevitability, it’s somewhat
inconvenient to have people make more or less free choices. Of
course, we always make choices in particular circumstances and our
choices are restricted by the way the world is – no one can choose
to be in two places at once – but even a small degree of choice
plays havoc with inevitability. Geras says that Marx’s work embraces
“a moral indictment resting on the conception of essential human
needs.” Moral outrage at the injustice of capitalism bubbles up
continually in Marx’s writing. Yet this is part of his incoherence:
he denies we have a given moral capacity in his assertion that the
“entire character of a species” lies in the “mode of life activity”.
If we don’t have a given instinct for freedom, why would we baulk at
tyranny? Marx is in a cleft stick: he wants it to be true, for the
coherence of his theory, that our nature is a product of how we
produce our means of life, yet simultaneously he implies the
“essential human needs” Geras speaks of. What’s the difference
between essential human needs and human nature? Geras is accepting
the needs as given, part of our biological endowment. This is what
Marx has a problem with because if such a nature exists, it can’t be
true that our entire character is a product of our work on the
world. There must be a pre-existing set of species capacities.
If empty organism theory is correct what would be wrong with
slavery, or for that matter concentration camps or death camps? If
we are what we are entirely through the economic and social
relations we have created, why would it be wrong for white people to
enslave black people or men to dominate women? Marx can’t have it
both ways: we can’t be simultaneously nothing but products of our
particular circumstances and opponents of those circumstances. Our
opposition has to arise from a sense of insult, but insult to what?
How can a particular set of circumstances insult what is only the
product of those circumstances? When the English peasants revolted
in 1381, it was because they felt a sense of injustice at the
imposition of poll taxes, among other things. Yet if they were
peasants by virtue of the economic relations of their time, and if
that was the full extent of their humanity, where was the ground for
objection? They may have accepted the structure of their society in
general, but they felt an insult to their humanity in being poor and
having taxes heaped on them by the rich. How would this be possible
without an experience of their humanity which exceeded its social
definition? It’s
exactly because of the mismatch between their given human nature and
what their society made them, that revolt was possible.
Marx provides no moral basis for egalitarianism because of his empty
organism theory. On the contrary, Leninism and its logical successor
Stalinism, are implied by Marx’s sociology. This is not to dismiss
the many worthwhile insights in Marx, nor his detailed analysis of
the working of the capitalism of his time. It is his sociology of
change in particular which entails the problem: because we are
products of economic relations, because the new human being Marx
proposes will be the product of changed relations, some agency is
going to have to ensure the appropriate relations are brought into
being and maintained. There is no given human nature, prior to the
specific relations, to rely on. Marx doesn’t propose that by
removing the barriers to the flourishing of our nature we can attain
liberty, rather a new nature must be elaborated by the establishment
of new economic relations. The workers may effect their own
liberation from capitalism, but only, in the first instance, to
institute “the dictatorship of the proletariat”. How this
dictatorship will operate, Marx is more or less silent about, but
history has been articulate. Clearly, it’s impossible for the entire
working-class to impose the dictatorship. Hence, his theory assumes
an elite cadre which will rule on behalf of the workers. There is
the open door for Lenin’s “democratic centralism” which is anything
but democratic, and from there it is a short step to Stalinism.
Ironically, representative democracy under capitalism has proven
kinder to the workers than the Marxist remedy he believed would be
their salvation.
The moral basis for egalitarianism is provided by a recognition that
we are inheritors of species capacities and the differences in
endowment between individuals are relatively superficial. The
equality of human nature resides in the fact that we all inherit the
same species capacities. We are all (barring catastrophic brain
damage) endowed by nature with a language faculty and a moral
faculty. Social inequality, as mentioned earlier, rests on the
notion that there is a correspondence between natural endowment and
social reward. In this view, society is an effective sorting
mechanism which allocates each individual to their rightful place:
the CEO to the boardroom, the zero-hours employee to low paid
stress. There is a glitch in the logic: there is no moral
justification for attributing rewards to people on the basis of
their endowment, even if that were what is happening. There are
plenty of justifications from expediency but none from morality.
The customary justification goes like this: the £250,000 per annum
barrister deserves her money for the special contribution she makes
to society. Further, she has had to qualify, which takes talent and
effort and her work in the courtroom requires skill in advocacy
which is relatively rare. The bus driver, on the other hand, has no
high level qualifications, does a job which requires only a
commonplace skill, makes a less valuable contribution and is
therefore rightly paid £20,000 per annum. This is a justification
from expediency. It has no moral import. It is, in fact, mere
hypocrisy. If bus drivers strike, their presence is soon missed and
the media waste no time in condemning them as selfish. Their
contribution is highly valuable, but that is still and argument from
expediency. The moral argument is that a bus driver shares her
humanity with the barrister and that common condition implies common
social experience. The bus driver needs a place to live, food for
her kids, clothes, heating, cultural activities, just like the
barrister. The differing roles we fulfil in the economy and society
do not justify differences in wealth, power or status. In order to
claim they do, we have to sneak in the idea of fundamental
difference. A barrister may be more skilled in advocacy than a bus
driver and ought to know more about the law, but how does that, from
a moral position, entail a greater share of the collectively
produced wealth? Even if it were true that the barrister’s work adds
much more to the economic product than the bus driver’s, it would
still be beyond moral justification to grant the former far more
wealth then the latter because by doing so a social division is
created which permits the barrister a far fuller life than the bus
driver.
Consider another example: a woman who works for herself producing
candles and soaps. She employs no one. She works long hours and
sells in volume. At length, through her own effort, she has
accumulated several million. How can there be any argument against
her wealth? Marx’s argument from exploitation is weak at this point,
but the argument from inherited common capacities much more potent.
First of all, the absolute independence of the candle-maker is
illusory. She has to source materials. She needs customers and they
have to earn their money. She is part of a social nexus in spite of
working alone. Our social connection is inescapable. It is part of
our inherited nature and it entails moral relations. All human
relations are moral. It’s no more possible to annul our moral
faculty than to annul our language faculty. Robinson Crusoe had no
moral relations until he discovered Friday, but he had no wealth
either. Had the streams of his island been teeming with gold nuggets
he wouldn’t have been wealthy because wealth is a social relation.
To have plentiful gold is meaningless if you’re alone, unless you
like to adorn yourself. The candle-maker’s wealth is socially
generated, however great her personal effort and she is a moral
agent who owes duties to those she shares her society with. Of
course, the simple question is why did she want to accumulate
wealth? The desire to be rich is also socially generated. We don’t
possess a given greed faculty. The evidence for a given language
faculty is overwhelming
but the arguments in favour of a natural desire for personal wealth
are forced and strained because the evidence is lacking.
There is no moral argument in favour of inequality because our moral
faculty resists it. Marx, however, believed moral judgments are
untrustworthy. He characterised them as “so many bourgeois
prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush, just as many bourgeois
interests.” He has to degrade moral judgement in order to elevate
the teleology of his theory: as the working out of history will do
the work of liberation, there is no need for moral judgements. Marx
also accepts capitalism (and slave-owning society and feudalism) as
necessary phases in the development of human society. His
theory has at its centre the notion that a moral objection to
slave-owning or feudalism is mere posturing; what is needed is an
intellectual understanding of how history functions. He believes he
has uncovered its core mechanism, the sociological equivalent of
natural selection. Hence his claim to the status of a scientist.
It’s clear he is trying to pass off philosophy as science. Darwin
derived his theory, substantially, from examination of the fossil
record. Marx was looking at the history of the choices we have made,
though he didn’t believe history was a matter of choice. The two
couldn’t be more different. It’s possible to be thoroughly objective
about the former but difficult in the case of the latter, because we
are inserted in the process we are trying to understand which drags
in subjectivity. His theory offers no explanation of how we make
moral choices. They are insignificant for Marx (a further assistance
to Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin). Once more, it takes only the most
minimal thinking to see how wrong this is: we make moral decisions
all the time and how could we do so were we not equipped by nature
with a moral capacity? How would we be able to speak were we not
endowed with a language faculty? The idea that our effort to produce
our means of life gave rise to language makes no sense. If it were
so, the language faculty would differ from one economic system to
another. Its universality means it must be a biological endowment.
Similarly, our universal moral decision-making implies an endowment.
There are almost unlimited contexts and variations, but the
fundamental operation remains consistent, as in language. It’s
likely our moral faculty works like the language faculty: from a few
very simple rules, by a generative process, we are able to produce a
huge (perhaps infinite) array of moral decisions.
As previously noted, Marx frequently assumes a moral position, in
spite of his mistrust of moral judgments. Presumably, he believed
his supposed intellectual understanding of history gave him
secure ground. Yet it’s curious that his teleology matches his moral
judgements. What would his view have been if he had concluded that
the working out of history would deliver us to endless tyranny, war
and exploitation? Would he have set aside his moral judgements and
accepted his intellectual conclusions? It’s transparently pat that
his intellectual theory corresponds to his moral outrage. Darwin, a
wealthy, respectable, Christian, English gentleman was shocked by
his discoveries. There was a mismatch between his subjectivity and
what the evidence told him. Marx, the pseudo-scientist, conveniently
elaborates a theory which confirms his subjectivity. The physicists
tell us heat-death is inevitable, hardly the conclusion which
corresponds to our
desires, but that’s science.
The universal language faculty is evidence (fairly uncontroversial
evidence) of a shared human nature. The fundamental operation of the
faculty is identical in everyone. If we assume this is a reasonable
model of the mind, we can theorise a given set of mental capacities
whose essential operation is consistent across all individuals. Of
course, there are all manner of differences in endowment, as
indicated earlier, but they are
relatively superficial. Crucially, they don’t constitute the
fundamental differences in nature which are necessary to the
maintenance of inequality of wealth, power and status. Wherever
inequality exists or has existed, it is always justified by
reference to supposed inherent difference. A slave-owner has the
right to slaves because he was born to be a slave-owner. Aristotle
believed slaves were born to their condition and would be unable to
live without instruction from their owners. The given nature of a
slave was fundamentally different from that of a slave-owner. Kings
were permitted to rule by divine right. A vassal was such by god’s
intention. People of colour were not fully human and women were less
so than men. Today, we have a rhetoric of equality which conceals
similar assumptions. An “entrepreneur” is somehow fundamentally
different from an employee. The implication is that nature has
endowed one with the capacity to command and the other with the need
to obey. It’s taken for granted that the life of a President is more
valuable than that of road-sweeper. This is mere expediency. There
is no moral perspective from which such a view can be upheld. That
the function of a competent President is more important than that of
a road-sweeper does not imply that the life of one is more valuable
than the other. None of us can step out of our humanity to make an
objective judgement about the relative worth of human lives.
Irrevocably inserted in our humanity we have no perspective from
which to judge lives as anything but equal.
Cultures of inequality have a need to persistently stress minor
differences in endowment. Marx’s theory is of little use in
resisting this. To argue against the idea that sports stars, film
stars, rock stars, CEOs, media celebrities and so on should earn
more in a week than many people earn in ten years on the grounds
that there is a teleology in history which will deliver a
cataclysmic clash between the owners of capital and labour in which
the latter will triumph, is hardly rational. Here is another
incoherence in Marx: he believes the outcome of history is
inevitable, but at the same time exhorts the workers to revolt. A
kind explanation would be he is assisting what is bound to happen,
but why should that be necessary? There is no need for exhortation
if the workers are bound to rebel. The Italian anarchist Camillo
Berneri had a different view: “We must move away from romanticism.
Look at the masses, I would say, in perspective….There is no
revolutionary will of the masses, but revolutionary moments when the
masses are a huge lever.” Berneri’s view rules out neither moral
choice nor the need to exhort. It embraces no inevitability but is
based rather on
realism and hope.
How can we argue against the huge rewards of the super-rich? The
left has difficulty with the wealth of the people’s cultural heroes
and heroines. To deplore the wealth of a film star is not at all
like criticising that of a factory owner. The Marxist inheritance
spavins the criticism. Billionaire footballers, beloved of the
masses, are hard to typify as exploitative “owners of the means of
production”. Yet it’s a short step from the adulation of a film star
to fawning before Donald Trump. The left is reluctant to accept the
notion of a given, permanent human nature because it seems to argue
against change. The mistake can be traced back to Marx: change must
be total. The new economic relations must create a new human being,
so it can’t be true that there’s an unchanging nature. Superficially
radical, this is in fact reactionary because of its assumption of
the need for a managing cadre. It also robs the left of its most
powerful potential argument: if we share an identical nature,
present in all individuals, and if differences are relatively
superficial, it is rational to organise society around equality; and
if we are moral creatures by nature, that is if we have an endowed
sense of fairness and justice, injustice is an insult to our
humanity. This is a far more potent argument than anything in Marx.
Indeed, because Marx denies the existence of an inherited moral
faculty, because he makes our very capacity for moral judgement
dependent on a particular set of economic relations (and yet at the
same time plays down all forms of moral decision-making) he implies
a governing power which must ensure the right conditions and robs us
of the means of criticising all forms of injustice as insults to our
nature.
What grounds are there for opposition to disparities of wealth,
power and status, if not
moral grounds, and how can those moral grounds exist if we
are not moral by endowment? The left, substantially because of its
Marxist inheritance, has eschewed moral objections, believing that
moral relativism is radical: the morality of capitalism shall be
replaced by superior
socialist morality. Yet the theory has no explanation for the origin
of moral judgements of any kind. If they are mere reflections of the
prevailing economic relations, they are not moral judgements because
a moral judgment is characterised by its ability to resist
prevailing assumptions.
Marx is right, of course, in pointing up the compliance of ideology.
The divine right of kings served the purposes of absolute monarchy
and is now defunct. Yet what is going on here is not the creation of
mind but its shaping. As Leslie Brothers argues in Friday’s
Footprint: How Society Shapes the Human Mind,
“social stimuli have physical effects on neurons.” Not only do
particular social stimuli generate ideas, they alter the working of
the brain. Yet what Brothers is highlighting is that mind is altered
by social stimuli; a quite different proposition from Marx’s
contention that our “entire” nature is a product of our economic
relations. The anxiety on the left that to accept a given, permanent
human nature will play into the hands of a static view of society is
misplaced. Social and moral progress are always the result of moral
choice and about that Marx is mistaken. We can’t arrive at moral
ends without choosing them. It wasn’t by the force of the powers
Marx invokes that, for example, women gained the vote. It was a
moral issue and by taking a moral stand the gain was made. Yet Marx
is forced to propose moral achievements without moral choice because
of his view of how change happens. The curious notion of an
egalitarian society of individual liberty without anyone having
chosen it gives power to the need for a ruling elite, because our
experience tells us good ends aren’t arrived at willy-nilly. How
will we prevent people driving at hundred miles an hour past the
primary school unless we choose ? There has to be some human agency.
It is because Marx effectively dispels human moral agency, which
doesn’t fit with his theory of history, that it re-emerges in a
grotesque form. This is the flaw Bakunin recognised in 1872. In
contradistinction to Marx he wrote of “the identity of human nature
at all times and in every climate” which permitted him to argue “The
liberty of man consists solely in this, that he obeys the laws of
nature because he himself has recognised them as such.” Bakunin,
that is, sites humanity in nature, while Marx proposes that we
escape nature through our relations of production. Nature is
“animal”. Ironically, by denying the idea of a given moral faculty,
a natural endowment, and theorizing a rising above what is merely
provided by nature through economic activity, Marx unleashes the
bestial in humanity. In place of a common moral nature relatively
gently applied comes the need for absolute command by an elite armed
with true consciousness.
Marx envisages a society without classes, a very morally attractive
vision, yet he has no faith in the people. They are compromised by
“false consciousness”. The new society will require a “dictatorship
of the proletariat”. Together, these concepts have been disastrous
for the left. While the capitalists have had the wit to grant
universal suffrage and undermine it through a wall-to-wall
propaganda system, the communists installed totalitarianism, gulags,
and commonplace political murder. These are not distortions of
Marx’s theory, they flow directly from his incoherent rejection of a
given human nature. He has no faith in the people, because he
doesn’t believe moral choice is the basis of social and moral
progress. Mere choice can be wildly out of kilter with the working
out of history. Hence, for their own good, the workers must be
directed by those who understand.
Marx has no theory of morality. His theory is genuinely amoral. He
relishes the prospect of equality and freedom, but he doesn’t depict
them as moral ends, freely chosen. They are something done to people
by the working out of history according to the iron laws of
“dialectical materialism”. Once again, there is an irony: his
putative science became a religion. True believers accepted the
entire package or were heretics (“revisionists” in the terminology).
Adherence to the doctrine became more important than making real
gains. Another disaster for the left.
By virtue of his leading position as an anti-capitalist theorist,
Marx has become, in certain circles at least, almost untouchable.
His is the theory with inner coherence and to challenge it is to
backslide into acceptance of injustice. Yet Marx is only one of many
anti-capitalist theorists and though his intellect sets him apart
from many, being beguiled by it into an uncritical conformism leads
only to a form of hero-worship. Bakunin may have been less of an
intellectual than Marx, but his predictions of where the theory
would lead were remarkably prescient. The anarchist critics of Marx
are no defenders of capitalism. What they don’t have, of course, is
his seductive apparent explanation of the motive force of history;
but the reason it’s absent is because they know it’s false. They
recognise history as messy process of moral decisions in which
nothing is inevitable until it happens. Interestingly, this view
corresponds to how language functions: the inner faculty is optimum
but externalised language is a dog’s breakfast providing an infinite
number of possibilities. Almost every sentence spoken has never been
spoken before and will never be spoken again. No sentence is
inevitable until it’s uttered or written. Yet what underlies this is
a universal endowment whose essential functioning is identical in
every individual. Our moral faculty is probably like this. It
doesn’t permit the historical neatness Marx theorises because there
are too many possibilities, but it provides the only true defence
against injustice: it is an insult to our nature.
Ridding the world of capitalism by a final cataclysmic conflict
between the employers and the workers may give a certain kind of
psychological comfort, but it is barely consistent with the
evidence. There is only one example of a workers’ uprising producing
a genuine, if short-lived, democratic economy: Spain 1936. It was
destroyed by the combined forces of fascism, Stalinism and
liberal-democratic preference for those when faced with a genuine
workers’ democracy. The revolution was brutal but Franco’s
dictatorship much more so. Can there be any doubt that the
possibility of change through peaceful means is a moral advance? It
may require piecemeal improvements and be frustrating but to ask
people to risk their lives on barricades when they can go to the
ballot box is highly morally dubious. The evidence suggests most
people in the capitalist so-called democracies accept the imperfect
systems and reject political violence (though Trump’s base is a
worrying exception).For orthodox Marxists, this is a disappointment,
hence those tiny groups of democratic-centralists still nursing the
fantasy that the revolution is about break out.
On the left in general, Marx’s inheritance inhibits the argument
from a given human nature. Yet if we can’t find the evidence to
argue that capitalism is an insult to or nature, how will we win the
debate? Most people in the leading capitalist societies reject
slavery. In the UK, Teresa May, an unflinching Tory, passed the
modern slavery legislation. What is the principal argument against
slavery? That’s it’s morally wrong for one person to own or buy and
sell another. The arguments from expediency would be in favour;
after all, the slave trade produced huge wealth. It is the moral
objection which matters. Yet if it’s wrong to buy and sell people,
why is it right to hire them? Employment is no more morally
justifiable in its essence than slavery. Of course, employees often
enjoy far better conditions than slaves, a moral advance; but the
principle holds: it’s an insult to our nature for one person to own,
buy, sell or hire another.
Marx’s theory, partly an assault on the dehumanising effects of
capitalist labour, introduces a dehumanisation of its own. By
effecting a division between “proletarian” and “bourgeois” and by
advocating violent uprising, it suggests a “bourgeois” is fit to be
killed. On the one hand Marx recognises that capitalists are victims
of their own system, that the self-exploitation of humanity is a
more profound problem than the exploitation of one class by another,
on the other his theory lends itself too readily to the notion of
exterminating enemies of the revolution. Together with the notion of
the “dictatorship of the proletariat” that leads straight to the
gulag.
To argue capitalism is an insult to our nature is not to let the
rich and their servants off the hook, but it is to acknowledge
Marx’s point: capitalists are human too. We are all diminished by a
system which denies our common humanity. The left has everything to
gain by putting the idea of a shared human nature at the heart of
its campaigning and consistently arguing that employment is morally
indefensible. Far from being a retreat from radicalism, the
recognition of our shared inheritance is more radical than Marx
because he proposes “dictatorship” and sneaks in the idea of a
managerial elite which will ensure the right conditions for the
emergence of the “new humanity”. Our shared moral nature makes
ruling elites unnecessary. We are endowed by nature with the
capacity to make the important decisions for ourselves. If we
weren’t, society simply wouldn’t function. To believe we are
incompetent to make our decisions is a little like arguing we need
to be told how to make our sentences. No ruling agency oversees our
linguistic behaviour. Why is such a thing necessary for our moral
behaviour?
This is the important point: all ruling elites must propose
themselves as moral. The Nazis didn’t proclaim themselves a force
which would slaughter 5.1 million Jew, 2.5 million Polish Catholics,
500,000 Romanies and drive the world into destructive war. They had
to have a moral excuse: lifting the German people from the
humiliation of Versailles, saving the German economy from
international financiers (ie Jews). Such phoney moral excuses are
always required because of our given moral nature. Capitalists use
arguments from expediency as if they are moral arguments. The way to
cut through this is to insist that disparities of wealth, power and
status are an offence to our shared humanity which claims the
organisation of our economy in its image.
The left should dispense with Marx’s incoherent rejection of a given
human nature, and push the notion that equality of endowment is the
fundamental truth. Differences are relatively superficial and none
provides a moral justification for a society divided between rich
and poor, powerful and powerless. What we know about our common
human nature is on our side. It isn’t the force of history, powered
by our economic effort which will liberate us, but our simple, given
moral capacity; a capacity trammelled and distorted by dehumanising
conditions.
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