STALINIST PERPETRATORS ON TRIAL: SCENES FROM THE GREAT TERROR IN
SOVIET UKRAINE
By Lynne Viola
Oxford University Press. 268 pages. £20/$29.95. ISBN
978-0-19-067416-8
Reviewed by Jim Burns
“The 1930s were years of mass repression in the Soviet Union. From
1930 to 1939, close to 725,000 people were executed, over 1.5
million were interned in prisons and labour camps, and well over 2
million were forcibly exiled to ‘special’ or ‘labour settlements’ in
the far hinterlands of the Soviet Union”.
I don’t suppose these figures will come as a surprise to many
people. The numbers of the injustices committed in the period
concerned have been known for some time. What is, perhaps, not as
widely known is that, towards the end of the 1930s, the purges
affected the one-time purgers. There were a series of
investigations, interrogations, and secret trials of members of the
NKVD, the state security police, who had been responsible for
carrying out the arrests, torture, and executions of those
victimised during The Great Terror.
Lynn Viola makes the point that it has often been assumed that many
of the victims of NKVD brutality were “members of the Communist
Party, the Soviet government, and the intelligentsia”, but that, in
actual fact, the “overwhelming majority” were “ordinary people,
mainly peasants, caught up in two large mass operations launched in
these years: one against former kulaks, recidivist criminals, and
other ‘anti-soviet’ and ‘socially dangerous’ elements’, and the
other against a series of non-Russian nationalities”.
The question is why some NKVD personnel suddenly found themselves
facing prosecution for transgressions of “socialist legality”? The
answer appears to lie in the desire of those higher up the ladder of
command to clear themselves of any blame for what had happened. And,
of course, the man at the top of the ladder was Stalin, who was
responsible for launching the purges in general. Viola locates the
necessity, in Stalin’s eyes, for a “social cleansing” in the events
of the Civil War in Russia following the 1917 Revolution. And then
there were the problems arising from the policy of the
collectivisation of agriculture when it was thought necessary to
eliminate the “kulaks”, the supposedly more-affluent peasants who
hoarded grain and other goods, and so defied the authorities. To
Stalin, and his cronies, there were sufficient “enemies within” to
justify their elimination in the interests of the planned socialist
utopia. Jews, Poles, and Germans living in the Soviet Union became
targets for NKVD investigation. Outsiders could not be trusted.
Viola’s study is based on what happened in Ukraine. The reason is
fairly obvious. Access to the records in Russia is now largely
limited following a brief period of openness when the Soviet system
collapsed. Not so in Ukraine after its break with Russia. Viola
doesn’t say it, but I suspect that the Ukrainians are more than
happy to provide evidence of communist, and in particular, Russian
misdeeds. One of the targets of the NKVD in the 1930s had been
Ukrainian nationalism, and especially what could classed as
“Ukrainian counter-revolutionary bourgeois nationalism”. Any number
of people could be rounded up under that classification.
What is particularly terrifying is that in 1937 the NKVD
headquarters compiled “a set of control figures for the number of
people to be arrested in the course of mass operation 00447. The
total numbers of planned arrests was 268,950, divided between a
first ‘most dangerous’ category (75,950) and a second ‘less
dangerous’ category (193,000)”. Those in the first group were
destined to be shot, those in the second would be sent to labour
camps. Operations were set to start in August, 1937, and to end in
four months. It doesn’t take many stretches of the imagination to
guess what was likely to happen when targets for arrests were then
sent out to various district offices of the NKVD. Set targets and
people will strive to achieve them and bend rules to do so.
What did happen becomes evident when Viola looks at the testimonies
of various NKVD officers who were unlucky enough to fall foul of the
purge of their ranks. In order to meet their quotas they weren’t
averse to manufacturing evidence and obtaining confessions by means
of beatings and other forms of “persuasion”. One of the excuses for
abusing prisoners was that the interrogators had to obtain fixed
numbers of confessions each day or night. And the numbers referred
to were staggering. One accused NKVD officer, while admitting that
no-one had actually told him to use torture to get prisoners to
comply, claimed that he was expected to provide “100 confessions a
day”. How else could he get that number of confessions quickly if he
didn’t beat his victims? This does sound somewhat fanciful, and
suggests someone desperate for an excuse. A likelier figure was the
seven confessions that an efficient officer was said to be able to
come up with each night.
The process was so streamlined that confessions were decided in
advance and all a prisoner was required to do was sign a blank
paper. Naming names was an essential part of the procedure. The
other details were filled in later. District offices of the NKVD
competed for the number of arrests and confessions, and if their
quotas were falling short they simply arrested anyone who might
appear to be unconventional in any way. Viola says, “In some cases,
city NKVD organs, as in Moscow, made use of the mass operations in
order to rid their city of undesirables – homeless people, beggars,
prostitutes, and petty criminals”.
There were cases where someone was arrested because they had
annoyed an NKVD operative. Viola points to the fact that local
police were involved in the arrest procedures, and they sometimes
had a reason for wanting a certain person out of the way.
The classic excuse of “following orders” was often given as a reason
for an officer’s behaviour. This, needless to say, could be pushed
up the line, though it was never going to reach the very top. But,
on the whole, it was rank-and-file NKVD members who were most likely
to be tried for their actions. It seems to be a fact that many of
them came from working-class or peasant backgrounds, and were
ill-educated. They had risen through the system of Communist Party
membership and related activities. Joining the NKVD gave them a
special status and various privileges.
Their roles as NKVD officers, with the powers that gave them, could
lead to them taking a particular pleasure in abusing intellectuals,
or those seeming to be better-educated. Viola refers to the case of
Lidiia Iosifovna Bodanskaia, “head of the Art Department of the
Khar’kov regional committee of the party”. When she was later
brought in as a witness against Ivan Stepanovich Drushliak, an NKVD
interrogator noted for his harsh methods when obtaining confessions,
she said that she’d signed any documents under duress. Viola
suggests that Drushliak may have “resented this older woman’s
education and intelligentsia background”.
Another NKVD officer, Vasili Romamovich Grabar, was “a product of a
Stalinist state-orchestrated social mobility, who had climbed the
rungs of Soviet power from very humble beginnings”. He had learned
his trade “in the violent grain requisitioning campaign of the late
1920s, riding roughshod over a peasantry that had been robbed of its
humanity and fleeced of its grain”. Like so many of his kind he was
also able to look to his own interests: “He was an operator, who
exploited his positions and connections in the food and trade
sectors of 1920s Berdichev for gain”
That personal gain was something that frequently marked the
activities of NKVD personnel can be seen in the accounts Viola gives
of the work of the execution squads. With so many people being
condemned to death, it was necessary to form these units to function
almost on an assembly-line basis. Victims were taken to a room to be
documented and told they were to be transferred elsewhere, to
another room where they were instructed to strip before having a
bath in the interests of hygiene, and then to a third room where
they were shot.
At first, their clothes were buried with them, but after a time the
execution squads were allowed to take what they wanted. Problems
arose when victims’ relatives came across items of their clothing
being sold at local markets. Money that was taken from those to be
killed was used to buy alcohol for members of the squads. With
executions in some cases adding up to forty per night the
executioners clearly needed to dull their senses. They justified
their seizure of clothing and other goods on the grounds that they
did a particularly nasty job and deserved to be rewarded for it. In
certain ways this sort of behaviour characterised the general
crudity of many NKVD operatives. Often from rough, poverty-stricken
backgrounds, and with experiences of war and famine when young,
their collective ruthlessness overcame any scruples they may have
had as individuals.
It may be true that Stalin was the person who triggered the purges,
whether by or of the NKVD, but there doesn’t appear to have ever
been a shortage of people willing to carry out the necessary work.
Human nature being what it is, ambition and careerism no doubt
played a part in persuading people to participate in activities that
others might regard as repugnant. There is, also, the tendency on
the part of some people to go along with what everyone else does,
perhaps because they don’t want to be seen as deviating from the
interests of the group.
Fear can be a factor, too, with possible threats of being viewed
with suspicion, and thought of as subversive as those who have been
arrested, likely to be in everyone’s minds. It’s easier to conform
than appear to stand out. And the “doctrine of superior orders”
often comes into play. It takes a brave man to refuse to obey an
order by a senior officer because of moral objections to carrying it
out. When one commander asked Nikolai Ezhov, head of the NKVD, what
should be done with disabled and elderly people among those
arrested, he was told to “Take them all to the woods and shoot
them”. One wonders if he actually followed orders? It’s more than
probable that he did.
Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial
is the sort of book that soon makes it obvious that it is dealing
with a situation where logic often didn’t apply. As Viola tracks
individual cases, the attitudes of the interrogators can only be
made to seem logical in the madness of the wider situation. One
prisoner, baffled as to why he was being asked to confess to alleged
crimes he knew nothing about, asserted that he was innocent and
“loyal to the party of Lenin”. His interrogator promptly replied :
“We know that you are dedicated to the party of Lenin, but you
betrayed the party of Stalin”. As Viola says: “It was impossible to
win this contest”.
Despite all the evidence of abuse of power that accumulated as NKVD
officers were investigated and tried, it does seem that, on the
whole, they were treated better than their victims. Their trials had
a semblance of legality, and they were allowed to make statements
about their actions and call witnesses to testify to their claimed
good behaviour, loyalty, and efficiency
Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial
is a fascinating, if at times shocking book. Shocking because it
shows how people given a little power will often abuse it. The
excuse of following orders from above runs through many of the
testimonies by NKVD operatives that Viola quotes from. But it is
clear that personal ambitions, greed, and other factors were also
relevant. Some NKVD officers enjoyed inflicting physical punishment
on those who wouldn’t co-operate. The situation gave them licence to
indulge their sadism and justify it on the grounds of confronting
criminality or terrorism. There may be a lesson to be learned here
about giving too much power to organisations which function under
claims of secrecy in the defence of state security.
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