FIGHTING
FOR SPAIN : THE INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES IN THE CIVIL WAR 1936-1939
By Alexander Clifford
Pen & Sword Books. 251 pages. £25. ISBN 978-1-52677-438-5
Reviewed by Jim Burns
I’m not sure how many books have been written about the
International Brigades and their role in the Spanish Civil War. My
own familiarity with them is limited to English-language
publications, and I can’t claim to have read all those that have
appeared in print. But I seem to have accumulated quite a few
histories, memoirs, novels, and other items which relate to why
people volunteered to go to Spain and what they did there.
And there have been films (documentary and fictional) and plays
which have touched on the exploits of Brigaders both during and
after the War. One of the examples that come to mind is
Scorpio, a 1973
film, directed by Michael Winner and starring Burt Lancaster as a
CIA operative who fought in Spain but is suspected of spying for the
communists and has been marked for assassination. He flees and makes
his way across Europe aided by the only people he can trust –
ex-members of the International Brigades. And there is a play,
Castles in Spain,
by Edward Boyd, originally broadcast on the BBC in 1986, and which
again involves veterans aiding each other in a tricky situation.
The point I’m making by mentioning these things is that a certain
legendary, even romantic quality surrounds the men and women of the
International Brigades. Over the years I met a few of them and
freely admit to having felt humble in their presence. They seemed
very ordinary, but I knew that they had done something remarkable by
going to Spain and could feel proud of their actions. One of those I
was introduced to bore the marks of his experiences all those years
before. And I used to see the quiet old lady who lived around the
corner from me slowly making her way to the local shops, and wonder
how many people knew that she had been a nurse with the Brigades in
Spain?
Alexander Clifford has written about Spain previously in his
The People’s Army in the
Spanish Civil War (see my NRB review, February, 2020) and it
did have material about the International Brigades. I was tempted to
say that his new book focuses solely on the Brigades, but that would
be misleading in some ways. They were part of the Republican army
and it’s difficult to completely separate them from what other units
did.
Likewise, it’s almost impossible to look at the activities of the
Brigades without considering the politics of the Spanish Civil War.
Clifford’s endeavour is to consider the military aspects of the
Brigades’ achievements and failures, but as both were affected by
political decisions regarding command, tactics, and supplies, the
overall political situation inevitably keeps surfacing. The Brigades
were a Communist Party invention and were largely controlled by
members of the Party, whether in military or political terms. Not
everyone who enlisted was a communist, though most were, but being a
Party member certainly helped when it came to promotion. This was
sometimes a drawback from the point of view of political awareness
not necessarily leading to battlefield capability. Marxist theory
was not a useful guide to commanding troops under fire.
When the war broke out in July 1936, the advantages in terms of
military effectiveness were with the Nationalist generals led by
Franco. They had a basic
force of around 30,000 members of the Spanish Foreign Legion and
Moroccan troops known as
Regulares. They were the best-equipped and trained units in
the Spanish Army and had experience fighting in colonial wars in the
1920s. The Foreign Legion, though modelled on the French Foreign
Legion, was largely Spanish and allegedly recruited from the
criminal classes and other social misfits. Both they and the
Moroccans had reputations as hard fighters but were also known for
their brutality.
As mentioned earlier, the Brigades were effectively formed under
communist tutelage, even if the Left in general supported the idea
of their creation. The plan was that they would help to boost the
Republican forces which, in
the early days of the war, comprised some loyal units of the army
and the para-military police, together with various militias often
formed from union members and small political parties like the
anarchists and POUM, a non-communist Marxist group. It was often
referred to as Trotskyist by the communists when they wanted to
disparage support for it. Membership of the Brigades has often been
disputed when it comes to the numbers involved. It was sometimes
suggested that as many as 45,000 volunteers came forward, but
Alexander proposes a lower figure of approximately 32,000. They did
not all arrive at the same time.
There were five main Brigades, numbered 11 to 15, and theoretically
they were each formed around a language categorisation. The 11th
Brigade was German-speaking, the 12th Italian, the 13th Eastern
European including Polish, the14th French, the 15th English. The
largest contingent came from France and Belgium (10,000), Poland
(3,100), Germany and Austria (3,000), Italy (3000), USA and Canada
(3,000), UK and Ireland (2,400), with smaller groups from a wide
range of countries. It needs to be noted that the language
demarcations were fluid, and units were often amalgamated in times
of crisis. The figures quoted for nationalities are approximations.
And, contrary to popular belief, Spaniards served in the
International Brigades almost from the beginning of the war and not
just towards its end when the input of non-Spanish volunteers had
more or less dried up.
Franco’s forces had a reasonable supply of arms and ammunition, and
could soon rely on a regular flow of the same from Germany and
Italy. The Republic, by contrast, lacked any kind of standard
armaments in sufficient quantity to outfit the militia units that
were essential for its survival in the early days of the conflict.
Consequently, a wide range of rifles, revolvers, machine guns and
artillery pieces needed varieties of ammunition to keep it
functioning, The International Brigades were faced with the same
problems once they began to go into action. They didn’t even have a
regular uniform, and the photos interspersed among Alexander’s text
display a bewildering array of jackets, hats and helmets, shoes and
boots, and other apparel.
Some of the senior officers (often Russians or East Europeans,
whatever else they claimed to be), were usually better dressed. An
exception to the rag-tag-and-bobtail look of groups of the British
volunteers was the strange George Nathan. He had served in the
British Army in the First World War and gained promotion from the
ranks to officer status. He later appeared in Ireland as an
Auxiliary, a group which had as notorious a reputation as the Black
and Tans, and then turned up in Spain. He was noted not only for his
spick-and-span appearance with shiny black boots and a swagger
stick, but also for his bravery. He was later killed in action.
It seems that Nathan was originally from a working-class background,
despite his turn-out and clipped speech. And this brings us to the
fact that eighty per cent of the volunteers were from the
working-classes and had no pretensions to being otherwise. The great
majority of them, those who survived the war and its aftermath, just
returned to the routines of their previous lives, when they could,
and left the writing of memoirs, novels and poems to others. An
assumption was born that Spain was awash with poets, painters,
novelists, and many more middle-class men and women putting their
lives on the line for the Republic. It may have been true that
authors and intellectuals flocked to Spain, but it was mostly to
observe and not fight. We now remember Hemingway and Stephen Spender
rather than Sam Wild (“a tough Mancunian”) and Bill Bailey (“the kid
from Hoboken”). I’m not
questioning the sincerity of many of those who went to help in their
various ways (though I suspect that some individuals may have been
guilty of “war tourism” and a few of radical chic) , nor dismissing
the sacrifices of those like Jason Gurney, a talented sculptor who
lost an arm, and John Cornford, who lost his life. It’s just a fact
that most of the dead and wounded, and those who survived, were from
the mines and mills and docksides of their respective countries.
A Non-Intervention Agreement supposedly obliged all the signatories
to stay out of the Spanish conflict, but was openly ignored by
Germany, Italy, and Russia.
Germany sent planes and pilots to Franco, and the Italians
provided thousands of troops, together with tanks, planes, and ships
to blockade Republican ports. Russia eventually begin to deliver
tanks, planes and their pilots, and supplies of rifles and
ammunition, though they were sometimes old stock, The lack of
up-to-date and reliable armaments
was a problem that the Republic never satisfactorily
resolved, any more than it solved the chaotic position with regard
to supplies generally. Clothes, food, medical equipment and
medicines were frequently never there when needed.
Alexander’s military history provides detailed narratives of the
various battles – Jarama, Brunete, Teruel, the Ebro are among the
main ones – indicating which Brigade units were involved, and how
they performed. I haven’t the space to analyse his accounts, but the
overall picture is often one of brave men attempting to follow
orders given from a distance and which ignored advice from those on
the ground who pointed out the flaws in the plans. The Brigades were
used as shock troops. They led the attacks that were launched on
Nationalist defences, and were expected to offer the stoutest
resistance when Franco’s forces, including the feared Foreign Legion
and the Moors, approached the Republican lines. There were Spanish
units with good fighting reputations, especially those commanded by
Enrique Lister and Juan Modesto, but if the others were mostly
comprised of badly-led and poorly-trained conscripts, they could
easily break under pressure. Because of their ideological
commitments the Brigaders were seen as more likely to stand and
fight,
They did, most of the time, and considering how they were frequently
not given enough efficient artillery back-up, and couldn’t rely on
sufficient air support, it’s surprising that they functioned as well
as they did. This doesn’t suggest that all was satisfactory with the
Brigades. Discipline could be a problem and desertions were numerous
enough to warrant harsh punishments as a means of dissuading those
thinking of sneaking away. It was said that André Marty, the
martinet commander of the Brigade base at Albacete, had around five
hundred men shot for disciplinary infringements. And there were
stories, sometimes disputed, that more than one deserter or
malingerer had been quickly and quietly disposed of at the front.
The nature of the Brigades, their reason for existence, and why
people volunteered to join them, all need to be taken into account
when considering why discipline could break down, and people
deserted or refused to obey orders. The Brigaders were not
professional soldiers, apart from a few officers. Some of the
British and European Brigaders had experienced wartime conditions
during the Great War. Very few of the Americans had. But, generally
speaking, most of the Brigaders had not signed on for a specific
period and, as volunteers, many of them thought that they should not
be held to staying in Spain indefinitely. Added to which, the
ramshackle conduct of the war by the Republican government was not
going to make them think that it could lead to a victorious outcome.
Their ideological commitment may have helped them put up with
unfavourable conditions, but even devotion to a cause can have its
limits if the cause seems increasingly hopeless.
The performance of the various Brigades could vary according to the
conditions at the particular location where they were in action. As
referred to earlier, they often didn’t get the artillery or air
support necessary to bring a situation to a definite conclusion. The
last major Republican offensive took place in the summer of 1938
when its forces made a successful crossing of the Ebro and initially
appeared to be breaking through the Nationalist lines. But the
advances eventually slowed and halted as supplies failed to reach
the front lines. In addition, Franco was able to bring in fresh
troops, something the Republican government was unable to do. Its
resources in men and materials were exhausted. When the Nationalists
started to counter-attack the Republican defences cracked and there
was a rush to retreat back across the Ebro.
It was clear by this time (Autumn, 1938) that the writing was on the
wall and the Republic was doomed. Internal divisions were evident in
the government, the Russians had more or less withdrawn from Spain,
and behind the scenes approaches were being made to Franco with a
view to bringing the war to an end. As a gesture towards a
withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country it was announced
that the International Brigades were to be disbanded. It has been
suggested that their effectiveness as a fighting force had, in any
case, virtually collapsed. With high levels of death, injury,
sickness, desertions, and other factors, the battalions of the
Brigades had been depleted. There were far more Spanish soldiers
than foreigners in their ranks. Clifford gives some figures. The
Lincoln-Washington Battalion of the 15th International Brigade had
200 Americans to 500 Spaniards, and about two-thirds of the British
Battalion were Spanish.
The Brigades had a final parade in Barcelona on the 28th October,
1938, and left Spain in December of that year and in January, 1939.
It would not be true to say that they all went home. Some did, but
German, Austrian, Italian, and other volunteers who came from
countries that were now right-wing dictatorships mostly went into
internment in France. Even when some men could openly return to
their countries of origin they were viewed with suspicion by the
authorities. American volunteers, for example, were still being
hounded by the FBI well into the 1950s. Alvah Bessie, who wrote a
book called Men in Battle
about his experiences in the International Brigades, later became a
screenwriter and went to prison as one of the Hollywood Ten. James
Yates, a black volunteer who I had the honour of meeting in Paris
thirty or so years ago, wrote in his memoir,
Mississippi to Madrid,
that he “was harassed by the FBI and rejected for every job for
which I applied”.
Clifford in his conclusion says: “Historians are right to point out
that the International Brigades suffered from poor leadership,
mismanagement, overtly oppressive and bureaucratic command
structures, haphazard communication and coordination with other
units, high levels of demoralisation and desertion, poor tactics and
shoddy equipment”. But he points out that “all these issues were
systemic flaws in the People’s Army more widely”. And it’s true to
say that although Brigaders usually received better training than
most Spanish recruits, and when it was available they were allocated
the best equipment, they were still poorly equipped for warfare.
They were not Gods, and could not be expected to bring about
miracles.
Their performances in action were variable, and Clifford considers
the 11th and 15th Brigades as the most efficient in the
circumstances, and the 14th the worst as the war progressed.
The 11th and 15th could
experience the same demoralisation in defeat that others did, but
usually recovered more quickly. And, as for their overall effect,
Clifford probably gets it right when he says: “Despite it all, they
fought and died for Spain and on the whole fought remarkably well.
This is how the International Brigades should be remembered – as
ideologically committed soldiers who made up for their lack of
training and equipment with heroism and a readiness to sacrifice”.
Fighting for Spain
should be read by those wanting a balanced picture of the
International Brigades. Alexander Clifford doesn’t attempt to make
heroes out of people who were imperfect in many ways and yet often
behaved heroically. He paints them as ordinary men who rose above
the ordinary by participating in a war they could easily have
ignored but chose not to. His book is a fitting tribute to their
courage. It is well-illustrated with maps and photographs, and has a
useful bibliography.
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