DARK MATTERS: Pessimsim and the Problem of Suffering
Mara Van Der Lugt
ISBN 978-0-691-20662-2
Princeton £28 Reviewed by Alan Dent
Van Der Lugt examines the work of seventeenth and eighteenth century
thinkers who addressed the “problem of evil” and the poles of
“optimism” and “pessimism”, the latter terms used in their
philosophical sense. Interestingly, pessimism was coined in response
to Leibnitz and optimism to Voltaire’s satire on his ideas. Some of
the philosophers she treats are slightly less well-known; Bayle for
example, who is deemed to have had a significant influence on Hume
among others. Malebranche, Maupertuis and La Mettrie too. Malbranche
(1638-1715) responded to the question of theodicy (why did God
create a world where evil is possible?) with the view that though
God could have made a perfect world, it would have entailed greater
intricacy and what he wanted was to balance an overarching
perfection with laws which are simple and universally applicable.
Maupertuis (1698-1759) contributed to science in including a visit
to Lapland to work out geodesic measurements. He also prefigured
evolution, to a degree, and employed the term “fitness” for an
animal’s chances of survival. His ideas regarding Van Der Lugt’s
area of study were to do with hedonistic calculus: is it possible to
find accurate mathematical measures of the comparative weights of
good and evil. La Mettrie (1709-1751) was a materialist who saw
human capacities as attributes of organised matter. He conceived of
us as machines and believed animals displayed a proto-morality. His
hedonism led to his death from over-eating.
Van Der Lugt goes into much detail, repeats herself a bit and having
explored the various contributions to the question of pessimism
versus optimism, offers her own thoughts as a conclusion. Her notion
is that pessimism, in the sense that we accept that life has a fair
degree of pain and difficulty, can help us towards sympathy,
compassion, tolerance. Pessimism, in the philosophical sense, isn’t
thoroughly negative.
The central question, theodicy, dissolves if you don’t believe in
god. Most of the thinkers she deals with took a deity for granted,
as was common in their time. Perhaps we should expect philosophers
to be less inclined to accept what is current. However, if god
doesn’t exist, there is no need to puzzle over why he put evil into
the mix. Accepting that there is no intelligent design casts the
question is a completely different light.
None of the people whose work is referred to provides a clear
definition of either good or evil. Some think there is physical evil
and moral evil. Physical evil might, for example, be toothache.
Maybe we need to define evil more tightly. Toothache is
excruciating, but it isn’t evil. It’s just the way the world is.
Sexual abuse of children is evil. A decent definition of evil might
be to know something is wrong and to do it anyway. But what do we
mean by “wrong”? If I hit you over the head with an iron bar and
steal your purse, that’s wrong. If I find your purse, look inside
and see your address and return it to you, that’s right. How do we
know? Experience tells us. We are moral like we are linguistic. Just
as we learn to speak effortlessly, so we
distinguish good from evil
actions. It’s wired in. Of course, there are cultural differences,
but you won’t find a culture anywhere which doesn’t set fairly
narrow limits. Is there a culture we know of where murder is
approved? The differences tend to be of degree rather than kind. The
important point is there is no culture we know of where there is no
morality. As Thoreau put it: “Our lives are startlingly moral.”
The question is, if I hit you with an iron bar to get your money, do
I know I’m doing wrong? Almost certainly, but my desire for money is
stronger than my capacity for restraint ( more or less a truism
about the people who run our economy). Did Hitler know he was doing
wrong when he sent people to the gas chambers? This is more complex.
He was complying with Europe’s programme of imperialist expansion
which was justified on the grounds that the white races were
superior. He sent Jews, the disabled, Romanies etc to the gas
chambers, but he treated British prisoners of war relatively well.
No British servicemen or women went to Auschwitz. He had come to
believe it was right, or at least acceptable, to exterminate the
lesser races. He was far from alone. Was this simply wrong thinking
or a form of psychopathology? Why not both? Maybe our ideas can
drive us mad. It’s often said Hitler was a criminal lunatic, but
most people in Europe in the 1930s agreed with him that there were
higher and lower races and the latter were expendable. A few decades
earlier, Keir Hardie said he didn’t go so far as thinking all races
equal. Maybe Hitler would never have mugged old ladies on the
street, even Jewesses, but with the power of the State at his
disposal and an ideology of racial superiority abroad, he could
believe he was doing good. Europe was superior. Wiping out those who
got in the way was right.
All the same, the definition above holds in that he obviously
thought sending British soldiers to the gas chambers was wrong, if
only tactically. He found a justification for what he knew contained
a portion of evil. Maybe Peter Sutcliffe did too when he smashed
women’s skulls with a hammer. Clearly, his thinking was disordered,
but I doubt he would have considered it legitimate for someone to do
the same to his wife or mother, which implies some residual sense of
wrongness.
Is it better not to be, or never to have been ? David Benatar,
author of Better Never To Have Been apparently thinks
so. It’s a question only the individual can answer. Running through
the book is another question: given the chance to live your life
again, would you? Some of the chosen thinkers assume most people
wouldn’t. That may be to do with their epoch. Most people lived
tough lives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and even the
philosophers didn’t have things easy. Democracy and hot running
water can make a big difference. My guess is if people in the UK
today were offered the same three score years and ten, most would
accept. There’s plenty that’s bad, but most people can get on with a
relatively pleasant life and the real fulfilments, like parenting
are unmissable.
These thinkers were of their time. We have intellectual advantages
they couldn’t have dreamt of. It’s much easier for us to see that if
evil weren’t possible, good wouldn’t be either. We have evolved with
a capacity for choice. How could we have evolved to do only good?
That would mean we had no choice, in which case there would be no
good. Good is, precisely, the choice to do good. Without the
choosing there is just something like bacteria crowding to the side
of the Petrie dish when the anti-bacterial agent is added, but even
that looks like a very, very crude kind of choice. The silly,
fantasy thinking which says, “Oh, wouldn’t it be nice if racism were
impossible” is a rejection of reality: it’s only because it is
possible we can choose to reject it. Rousseau is wrong. Man isn’t
born free. We have evolved with a moral sense which requires us to
make choices every minute. There never was an innocent state of
nature. We have always (since we gained language and abstract
thought) been a problem to ourselves.
The question of happiness arises in much of the thought discussed.
By its nature, happiness is subjective, though it’s almost certainly
possible to be objective about the conditions which promote it, and
once again, we don’t need philosophy, experience is good enough. Ask
anyone if sleeping on the streets, going hungry, being lonely,
suffering prejudice and similar deprivations would make them happy
and it would be unlikely you’d get many affirmative answers. Ask
them if a pleasant, warm house, a stable family, friends and social
acceptance would and the result would probably be equally
predictable. We know from experience what makes us happy because,
once again, we’re wired for it. Prisons are nasty places because we
know what hurts people and we think punishing them is justified
(which is how we create old lags). No one needed philosophers to
tell them how to build Wormwood Scrubs.
Hume, who has a chapter here, is featured because of his arguments
which favour pessimism; but Hume’s greatest contribution is
recognising the limits of philosophy, or indeed human cognition. The
power of philosophy is to make us attend to facts, evidence, logic
and basic moral principles. Will that make us happy? Not necessarily
or consistently, but it will save us from the despair which comes
from a regime of lies, deceit, injustice and moral corruption.
Philosophy, like all knowledge, has limits, and they are pretty
narrow. There are questions it’s interesting or even useful to
examine, like why we enjoy having friends; but you can’t get beyond
the fact that we do. Like we have arms and legs. It’s part of our
biological endowment. Philosophy’s task is to help us understand
what that endowment is so we don’t try to live against it. Hume’s
insistence on limits adds to that effort.
The problem of suffering, in the sense of evil, is a matter of
relationships. Suffering back ache is wearying and depressing, but
it isn’t usually the result of evil. There’s no evil in the fact
that natural selection cobbled together the spine from the materials
around under environmental pressure. Shakespeare is right: “There’s
no fault in nature but the mind”. Evil, like language, is
exclusively human. No animal can produce an invalid sentence because
they can’t produce sentences. Nor can any animal commit a moral
fault because they don’t have morality. We, on the other hand,
produce sentences as easily as breathing and we make moral choices
in the same way. Cancer is a horrible disease but it isn’t evil.
Selling people cigarettes when you know they provoke cancer is. It’s
a choice, and to put your own gain before someone else’s well-being
is morally despicable (even though it’s what our economy is based
on). Evil is a relationship and so is the suffering which flows from
it. Is there anything which makes us suffer like cruel treatment?
The value of this book is partly that its detail brings into focus
the work of some of the most important thinkers of the era it
covers. It’s important to site their work in its time. The economic,
social, intellectual, emotional, religious and artistic context made
a big difference. Van Der Lugt’s study also raises the questions we
should all be thinking about. We are better placed to deal with them
then Bayle, Voltaire etc. They may have had genius but we have the
work of geniuses they never knew. Van Der Lugt is a fine scholar.
Her research is extraordinary and there is much even those familiar
with the territory will learn. Her style is slightly headlong and
she’s an academic not a writer. She isn’t Jane Austen or James
Joyce, but this is a reference book of great worth. Its title belies
its pleasures. It will cheer you up.
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